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A B S T R A C T
Historically, long-waves have characterized transformations of the energy systems. There is not much reason to
assume that our current energy system is here to stay. One possible future option is that renewables will provide
all energy needed. While many scenarios exist showing that this is technically feasible, the related costs, speed of
technology diffusion and social and political acceptance of such an energy transition are fiercely debated, both in
the scientific field as well as in politics. Yet, there is growing consensus that renewables are becoming estab-
lished as a key building block in the energy system, irrespective of the exact shares they represent. The focus
should shift from a debate surrounding the feasibility of a 100% renewable system to how we can enable a
speedy and immediate upscaling.
1. Introduction
Since the industrial revolution, the energy system has been subject
to rapid technological change and altering dominating energy sources,
characterized by long-waves of transformations [1]. For a relatively
short time span now, the energy system has relied almost exclusively on
fossils. Over the past decades, several of the “modern” renewable en-
ergy technologies2 have quickly developed from serving niche appli-
cations to mature, cost-competitive technologies experiencing strong
growth [4]. This has led to a crossroad with not much reason to assume
that our current energy system is here to stay. Brazil and France are two
well-known examples where a transformation from fossils to renew-
ables and nuclear, respectively, occurred within a few decades [5].
One possible future option is a (close to) 100% renewable energy
system.3 While many scenarios exist showing that this is in principle
technically feasible [6–11], the related costs, speed of technology dif-
fusion and social and political acceptance of such an energy transition
are fiercely debated, both in the scientific field [12–15] as well as in
politics. Yet, there is growing consensus that renewables are becoming
established as a key building block in the energy system, irrespective of
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the exact shares they represent. The High-level Political Forum in its
2018 review of SDG 7 on energy ‘calls upon Governments and other sta-
keholders to accelerate the pace of transition towards renewable energy’
[16]. We do believe that the positive narrative of a future relying on
renewables has not gained sufficient attention in recent debates
[12–15] and is worth bringing forward explicitly to this end.
In this article, we argue that the scenario-based debate analyzing
the role of renewables in future energy systems has put too much em-
phasis on the question whether a 100% renewable share is feasible over
the question how renewables can be scaled up as fast as possible. Too
much emphasis is put on the rather uncertain longer-term perspective
over short to medium-term actions, deviating the debate. This in our
view bears the danger of one-sided interpretations of scenario-based
analyses of energy systems transformations, which could lead to “un-
balanced” priorities, delaying much needed action. Policy makers ask
for short-term and practical implications while many scenarios are
targeted at long-term analyses. In the current discourse a set of argu-
ments are often overseen. With this article we want to prompt an in-
creased focus on short-term action both in scenario analysis and policy
design, despite long-term uncertainty. Before elaborating on these ar-
guments in more detail, we first take a closer look on what scenarios
can teach us.
2. What scenarios can teach us!
Scenarios are a mean of identifying feasible future pathways, the
impacts of different policy options and ranges of uncertainties of al-
ternative futures. They can also support the formulation of objectives
[17]. They are, however, not meant to be predictions of what will
happen in the future, but rather consistent descriptions of what could
happen. We thus like to think about scenarios as a consistent framework
to compare alternative, plausible futures. When looking further ahead
the future becomes more uncertain and predictions thus more difficult.
Therefore, scenarios are used to construct contrasting visions that re-
flect the same boundary conditions but that differ enough from each
other to capture a realistic range of possible future pathways as well as
resulting in different future challenges. They are also a useful tool to
explore combinations of technologies that can be configured towards
technically feasible systems and provide an indication on the speed of
transformation.
We believe that the power of scenarios lies in proving the feasibility
of an aspirational future, such as an energy system that relies on large
shares of renewables, maybe even 100%. They guide us on what has to
happen to get to such a desired state. Such sustainable scenarios have a
range of common characteristics [18,19]: i) they decarbonize the en-
ergy system, ii) electrify applications of fossil fuel use in industry and
buildings and as much as possible in the transport sector, and iii) reduce
overall energy demand. Many of these scenarios also have a large
portfolio of different energy technologies, incl. biomass, storage, de-
mand side management, etc. as this increases the flexibility and resi-
lience of an energy system [2]. Excluding any of these options ex-ante
poses heavy constraints on the energy systems. Compared to scenarios
with higher energy demand and less stringent climate objectives, the
sustainable scenarios experience less rapid and lower growth rates in
renewable energy technologies as they mostly have to meet lower
overall energy demand [19]. Still, the deployment of renewables
technologies in less stringent scenarios is in line with global potential
estimates of renewables [20].
These scenarios show that technically the global energy system can
transform toward 100% renewables within the 21st century. This
question has been answered for some time now. Even with today's
technologies near 100% should be possible. The fact that there is still an
ongoing debate on whether a renewables share of near 100% can be
accomplished is mostly owing to questions about cost competitiveness
and scaling potentials of renewables. Against this background we think
that the current focus of the debate arguing on which share of renew-
ables is feasible by when is partially misleading and should shift to-
wards how renewables can be up-scaled substantially and quickly,
starting the transformation immediately.
In the following, we want to point out four arguments that in our
view have been partially overlooked or that at least have not received
sufficient attention in the current discourse. If considered jointly they
Fig. 1. Stylized scheme of four key drivers of a transformation of the energy system towards high shares of renewable energy: 1) tipping elements, 2) learning
potentials, 3) co-benefits, and 4) energy sufficiency. The business as usual pathway of renewables related cost and benefit curves and equilibrium are shown in red.
The transformative pathway and related (shifted) cost and benefit curves and resulting equilibrium based on drivers 1–3 are shown in green while energy sufficiency
(driver 4) would lower overall energy demand, making achieving 100% even easier which would result in another equilibrium, and cost and benefit curves not shown
here. Note on the y-axis: Renewable capacity (GW) is not meant to be equated to the share of renewable energy (GWh). Both are depicted as they are relevant for the
drivers. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
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would likely lead to different interpretations and implications of long-
term energy scenarios. They are complementary and re-enforce each
other. We want to illustrate this conceptually in Fig. 1:
Panel A, on the vertical axis displays the total renewable capacity,
or the share of renewable capacity in total demand, respectively de-
pending on the effects described in the following. The horizontal axis
displays time. The black segment of the curve displays the historical
trajectory of renewable energy (RES) expansion. It branches off in ei-
ther a business as usual (BAU) trajectory (red) – which is a continuation
of the historical transformation rate or a transformative trajectory with
exponential rates of change (green). The renewable energy trajectories
and therefore the maximum share of renewable generation serving
demand is constrained by the technical potential (blue shaded area)
which is determined by resource endowment, available conversion
technologies, but also by the technical capability of the system to ac-
commodate large shares of renewables. The whole technical potential
however usually is never fully utilized as it would not be economical.
Panel B shows conceptually two curves displaying the marginal cost c
or the marginal benefit b in dependence of the deployment level x of
renewables. By definition, costs increase marginally due to the gradual
exploitation of the best resource sites and higher costs of integrating
renewables. Contrary, the marginal benefit of renewables decreases for
higher shares of renewables. The intersection of both curves constitutes
the long-term equilibrium, which determines the – economically effi-
cient – level of renewables deployment. When we look at the end-point
of the red trajectory (BAU) (Panel A) achieving a renewable share of
100% of generation seems like a very tall order. Higher shares would be
uneconomic and 100% would be beyond the technical and integration
potential. We however think this discussion, which is strongly based on
an extrapolation of the past into the future, is partially misleading as a
near 100% renewables share in generation could be reached in another
way, and potentially easier, than we think now.
3. Four arguments why a renewables transformation could be a
piece of cake and not a pie in the sky
We now draw attention to a set of elements, which we feel could
push such a transformation, as shown in the alternative future pathway
(green) in Fig. 1.4 We will discuss them in detail below: 1) tipping
points within the energy system; 2) vast learning potentials of renew-
able energy technologies with recent cost reductions to as low as ȼ3/
kWh and 3) multiple co-benefits related to the UN Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement and 4) a demand side
focus emphasizing energy sufficiency and efficiency.
3.1. Tipping the system: disruption of the system can trigger innovation
Achieving the SDGs and the Paris Agreement requires a deep
transformation of the energy system. Scenarios can guide the way how
to get there and show what is technically feasible. They however cannot
be translated one-to-one into an actionable agenda. The reason is that
system transformation in ‘reality’ does not take place in the same gra-
dual way as it can typically be observed in the models. This is so, since
implicit assumptions underlying the scenarios in the “real world” ty-
pically cannot assumed to be given, but have to be created, which is the
truer the greater the desired trajectory departs from a BAU trajectory.
This pertains for instance implicit assumptions regarding perfect fore-
sight, information or rationality, or centralized decision-making. We
therefore argue it would be plausible to aim for a faster expansion of
renewables than what is deemed “optimal” in scenarios. This creates
accelerated renewables expansion. The energy system is known to be
inert which is due to deeply rooted path dependencies of energy
infrastructures, but also cognitive ones (mental maps). A mere gradual
push triggered through renewables policies is unlikely to enact the
system transformation at the scale that is needed. What is rather needed
is a “system shock” that pushes the system sufficiently out of its equi-
librium creating incentives for new business models and technologies;
or put differently: the new technologies to enable 100% renewables
share cost efficiently will only be developed when the suitable in-
centives are in place to do so. To illustrate this more clearly, one can
think of the rapid expansion of renewables in particular in the elec-
tricity sector in several pioneering markets globally, where some would
argue that the expansion has taken place too fast as reflected by the
decreasing market values of renewables – the dynamic view of this is
however a different one. This “oversupply” of electricity creates in-
centives to think about new business models and actor coalitions, de-
mand side participation, prosumerism and the like. It also triggers new
applications, e.g. mobility, of sector integration. Altogether, this will
cause the tipping points that can shift the system towards a new tech-
nology portfolio (Fig. 1a, driver 1).
On the other hand, in case of mere gradual change the current
system is more likely to adapt and revert to the old equilibrium. As a
consequence, potentials for cost efficient deployment and integration of
renewables might not be fully deployed, which may effectively limit the
overall renewables share. A “system shock” also has an important role
to play to signal actors that the transformation will go beyond gradual
changes. Actors have to internalize in their expectations that change
will happen to generate new ideas and business models that are re-
quired. The positive message propagated by many actors is part of a
self-enforcing process: initiatives get organized, set ambitious plans,
which lead to shifts in perspectives, divestments, change in expecta-
tions and trust in future systems dynamic on the way to a tipping point.
Ideally national plans get over fulfilled by bottom up goals (e.g. cities),
investors, etc. Some elements of this can already be observed now.
Irrespective of national or international policy commitments, there is a
plethora of non-state actors who are already pushing for renewables
within their scope of decision-making. Cities and investors are key ac-
tors in the support of renewables and decarbonization [21]. Several
alliances of cities and communities, home to millions of people, are
pushing for a renewable energy transformation (e.g. Carbon Neutral
Cities Alliance,5 Climate Mayors,6 Global Covenant of Mayors for Cli-
mate & Energy,7 Go 100% RE,8 Go 100%9). Cities and local govern-
ments have strong purchasing power (public transport and fleet, public
procurement) and agency in designing regulations, such as renewable
energy targets. Many metropolitan areas exceed nation states in terms
of income, population and energy demand. With increasing urbaniza-
tion cities’ leverage within the energy transformation will further in-
crease in the future.
Investors and businesses are also pushing renewables. An example is
the Break through Energy Coalition10 that aims to accelerate innovation
in the energy realm. It brings together investors with economic power
larger than nation states. More than 100 non–energy sector businesses
with 100% renewable goals in electricity have formed the initiative
RE100.11 Utilities are investing in renewable energy technology compa-
nies and are integrating renewables into their business plans. Recent di-
vestment announcements include the Word Bank Group's stop on finan-
cing upstream oil and gas after 2019 [22] and Norway's notion to divest
the world's biggest sovereign wealth fund's oil and gas holdings [23].
4 For an exhaustive list of arguments in favor of a renewable energy trans-
formation we refer the reader to the Global Energy Assessment (2012).
5 Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance: https://www.usdn.org/public/page/13/
CNCA.
6 Climate Mayors: http://climatemayors.org/.
7 Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy: http://www.
globalcovenantofmayors.org/.
8 Global 100% RE: http://www.go100re.net/.
9 Go 100%: http://www.go100percent.org.
10 Break Through Energy Coalition: http://www.b-t.energy/.
11 RE100: http://there100.org/.
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We conclude that scenarios do not (yet) reflect non-linear change
dynamics in a satisfactory manner. A move to a low-carbon energy
future requires a drastic change in energy investment and the resulting
mix in energy technologies. If history is any guide, energy scenarios
overestimate the extent to which the future will look like the recent
past. We cannot and do not yet know all future technologies, change is
not predictable. We have not set the incentives to create them, at the
same time the current technology portfolio would be sufficient to carry
the energy transformation through.
3.2. Learning potentials: a fundamental transformation towards high shares
of renewables in the energy system is feasible because renewables can be up-
scaled quickly and have become cost competitive
A diverse portfolio of different renewable energy technologies exists
that can provide the best suitable option for each energy service need.
The new renewable energy technologies predominantly produce elec-
tricity. The electrification of the energy system and the resulting dec-
arbonization of the electricity system will be at the core of the energy
transformation. Renewables play a critical role in electrification, con-
tributing around 90% of this growth in 2015 [24]. Moreover conversion
of electricity to mechanical work is very efficient while the efficiency of
fuels going through the thermodynamic cycle is limited (average of
38% for OECD plants) [4].
The diversity, abundant availability and flexibility of renewable
energy technologies is key for system resilience and security. In recent
years renewables, foremost wind power and solar photovoltaics (PV),
have excelled with faster growth rates and lower costs than [25–27].
Today, renewable energy technologies have reached grid parity chal-
lenging fossil fuel power generation [28]. The world's lowest auction
result for utility PV has reached 2.69 ȼ/kWh in Mexico [29], with global
weighted levelized cost of energy (LCOE) estimated at 6.00 ȼ/kWh for
PV and 5.00 ȼ/kWh for onshore wind in the coming year [30]. Fossil
fuels are still often heavily subsidized, irrespective of their negative
externalities such as air pollution and climate change.
The witnessed cost reductions, such as by more than two thirds in
PV in the past six years [30], have not translated to appropriate dif-
fusion rates in most long-term energy scenarios, which underestimate
the renewable energy potential [25,26]. Yet, reality is moving fast.
Capacity additions in renewable power reached more than 60% in
2016, with the highest ever annual capacity addition of over 160 GW.
Investments in renewable energy have outpaced the ones in fossil fuels
by a factor of two [4]. There is still room for further costs reductions,
especially with up-scaled installation and production, affecting the
potential equilibrium (Fig. 1b, driver 2).
New renewables are more granular than conventional energy
technologies. Granular technologies are small scale, modular, replic-
able, divisible, and have low unit cost. They reach larger cumulative
output numbers through up-scaling and have higher learning rates than
lumpy technologies [31]. Novel analysis of historical data shows that
granularity enables faster and less risky diffusion outcomes with more
equitably distributed benefits [32]. Renewables have thus a larger po-
tential for quick system transformation.
Both developed as well as developing countries have achieved large
shares of new renewable energy in their electricity generation and
strong recent growth rates. Denmark has increased the renewable en-
ergy share of its power generation from 16% in 2000 to 62% in 2016
[33]. Cabo Verde has become the country with the second largest share
of wind power in its electricity mix, which it increased from only 5% in
2005 to over 28% in 2014. Individual regions and countries differ in
their initial conditions, both with regard to resource endowments,
geography as well as socio-economic and political circumstances but
the new renewables portfolio is flexible and versatile enough to suit
different demands. Especially when new infrastructure has to be built, it
is a no-brainer to go for renewables to avoid long-term system lock-ins.
3.3. Co-benefits: multiple benefits of renewable energy systems support
implementation of the SDGs and achievement of the Paris Climate
Agreement
With SDG7 a proper goal within the UN 20030 Agenda on sus-
tainable development on energy, the global community accentuates
energy's crucial role for human advances as well as its environmental
externalities that threaten Earth-system stability (45). SDG 7 calls, be-
sides universal energy access, for a push for renewables and for im-
provements in energy intensity. Up to date the global energy system has
had strong adverse impacts on humans, the economy as well as the
Earth-system, from climate change [34], air pollution and health [2,24]
to water stress [35] to name but a few. In a qualitative assessment of
how SDG 7 interacts with the other SDGs [36], the positive interactions
dominate the negative ones in absolute terms and magnitude. These co-
benefits also influence the potential equilibrium (Fig. 1b, driver 3). The
renewables target of SDG 7 is seen favorably in literature [36,37] as it
has positive impacts on SDG 3 (health) and SDG 11 (cities) because of
reduced indoor and ambient air pollution, SDG 6 (water) due to lower
water demand, SDG 12 (sustainable production and consumption) due
to natural resource protection and of course SDG 13 (climate).
With the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the global community
agreed to jointly keep global warming (well) below a global mean
temperature increase of 2 °C above pre-industrial times [38]. There is
only limited time left to meet this objective. The energy sector has
contributed intensely to anthropogenic climate change. With around 33
GtCO2 [9] energy related GHG emissions amount to ~70% of total
anthropogenic GHG emissions [39]. The global energy system must be
decarbonized by mid-century, which translates to a complete phase out
of fossil fuels [40]. The Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) of
the Paris Agreement and SDG7 are policy approaches to tackle the
challenge of an energy transformation and they are broadly consistent.
Neither of them is sufficient to meet the 2 °C or even 1.5 °C goal [41]. To
meet both, reduction in energy intensity and more renewables are
needed in the system.
In 2015, outdoor air pollution, predominantly driven by the current
energy system, caused around 3 million premature deaths. IEA [24]
highlights the importance of policies such as efficiency and renewable
energy policies that avoid pollutant emissions when improving air
quality. McCollum, Krey and Riahi [42] found synergies of dec-
arbonization and energy efficiency with regards to pollution control
and energy security of $100–600 billion annually (0.1–0.7% of GDP) by
2030. IRENA [9] estimates benefits of between two to six-times the
decarbonization costs. Health benefits of climate policies provide one of
the most attractive entry points for policy makers to promote renew-
ables, as the example of China [24] or the debate on diesel combustion
engines and electric mobility in European countries [43] show.
The energy sector is responsible for around 15% of global water
withdrawals12 that are mainly needed to cool thermoelectric power
plants [44]. Promoting renewables to mitigate climate change offers co-
benefits for water as non-thermal renewables such as wind and solar PV
have very low water requirements compared to other low-carbon
electricity technologies [45]. Decreasing the water consumption per
unit of electricity generated enhances the resilience of power supply,
especially important for developing countries. Their electricity demand
steeply increases while many are prone to water stress and strongly
affected by climate change [46].
12 Note the difference between the terms ‘water withdrawals’ (water with-
drawn from its source to be used, which might be returned to varying degrees)
and ‘water consumption’ (the portion of water that is not returned to the ori-
ginal water source after withdrawal. It is thus no longer available for reuse).
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3.4. Sufficiency: demand side focus by emphasizing energy efficiency and
‘negawatt’ potentials
The role of the demand side is too often overlooked when discussing
future energy transformations (such as in the recent debate on the US
energy system, [12–15]). Reductions in demand provide a valuable and
often most affordable energy “source” [2,28] and make achieving high
shares of renewables easier. Investments in energy efficiency have long-
term benefits – they are no-brainers when keeping in mind economic
and population growth. Yet they only amounted to 14% of total energy
system spending (USD 1.6 trillion) in 2015 [47]. Lowering energy de-
mand increases flexibility on the supply side. The demand for base load
decreases, which enlarges the technology portfolio. Every unit of en-
ergy that is not needed, be it through behavioral or technological
changes need not be provided in the first place or can be used some-
where else. Given the conversion losses in the system, reductions on the
end-use side translate to large upstream reductions on the supply side.
These “negawatts” [48] are at least as important as additional mega-
watts from renewables. A recent scenario identifies energy needs and
technological change from an end-use perspective, focusing on energy
services [49]. This bottom-up approach leads to a global final energy
demand of 245 EJ in 2050. Such a comparativley low demand can more
easily be met with renewables. Looking at Fig. 1a (driver 4), lowering
overall energy demand would make achieveing a renewables transfor-
mation even easier.
Electrification of the energy system driven by renewables will lower
overall energy demand significantly [2]. This can also lead to a great
leap in efficiency in mobility. Propulsion with combustion engines re-
quires roughly three times the energy compared to electric motors.
Electric mobility would further drive overall renewable electricity
production and support demand management. In addition to elec-
trification of mobility, biofuels such as ethanol can play an important
role in the transformation of the transport sector as the example of
Brazil can show. Today, more than 90% of cars sold in Brazil are flex-
fuel vehicles, running on pure ethanol or gasoline blends (18–27.5%)
[50]. The year 2017 brought about unexpected policy announcements
in transport. We can already see examples of legislation banning con-
ventional combustion engines in cars by 2040 (e.g. France [51]).
Norway has supported electric vehicles with a range of favorable po-
licies which has led to the highest per capita penetration rate globally
(21.5/1,000 people in July 2016) [52] and is aiming for 100% electric
or plug-in hybrid car sales by 2025 [51].
Digitalization, demand management and smart systems will be an
important element in an energy system with many volatile renewable
energy sources. OECD/IEA [53] estimate that smart demand responses
to provide system flexibility of 185 GW or savings in electricity infra-
structure investments of USD 270 billion. Digital technology has
transformative potential and is conducive for integrating variable re-
newables, electric vehicles and distributed electricity generation.
Minimum performance standards also spur improvements in energy
intensity across applications and sectors. Increasing the coverage of
energy use sectors by such standards would lead to harnessing fallow
present but also future potential in reducing energy demand. Today,
two-thirds of global energy use in buildings are still not subject to any
minimum performance standards [53]. This is especially relevant when
considering the long life times of buildings. Overall, aiming for im-
provements to match current best practices across industries and
technologies would already contribute largely to decreasing overall
energy demand. Despite energy efficiency standards in the end-use
sector (e.g. electrical appliances) being more advanced than in other
areas, more challenging changes relate to fundamental changes in be-
havior (e.g. shared economy, dematerialization, circular economy,
sustainable consumption patterns) which will take longer to materialize
but which has huge transformational potential. At the same time, the
demand side is characterized through granular energy end-use tech-
nologies which, as mentioned, have higher learning rates and diffuse
faster [31].
Electrification will not be possible in all sectors and applications.
Hydrogen can act as a complementary energy vector in the transport
sector, especially for aviation and shipping but also for cars as Toyota
and Honda show with their fuel cell vehicles. Hydrogen provides an
energy storage option, complementing intermittent renewables. It can
also complement electricity in the energy system with the possibility of
grid-connection, both locally but also globally [54]. Magnetic levitation
could be used for trains and elevators while the Hyperloop13 could
revolutionize medium distance travel. Biofuels in aviation are another
option [55]. Within the industry sector, efficiency can be spurred by
switching to hydrogen. Hiebler and Paul [56] showed that steel pro-
duction can be achieved in an environmentally friendly way while
achieving cost reduction of around 20% if hydrogen is used for re-
duction.
4. Conclusion
We have raised four arguments that we believe will make high
shares of renewables in the energy system easier to achieve than cur-
rently expected: 1) tipping elements in the system, 2) vast learning
potentials of renewable technologies, 3) their many co-benefits and 4)
energy sufficiency. We should capitalize on them. By highlighting these,
we try to distill guiding elements for policymakers from a complex
debate, which has been subject to ample research. Its scope, long-term
outlook and uncertainties can be unsettling for current policy action.
We believe that a positive narrative is a strong fundament for a re-
newables transformation.
A wide literature on energy scenarios exist covering a plethora of
possible futures. Scenarios illustrate the long-term implications of
policy decisions. They provide perspectives to guide current policy
debate which we hope to enrich through this focused contribution.
Even conservative scenarios (in terms of learning rates of renewable
technologies or energy demand) can achieve close to 100% renewables.
Scenarios with high growth rates in renewables based on currently
observed trends, combined with low demand, as shown by Grubler,
Wilson, Bento, Boza-Kiss, Krey, McCollum, D. Rao, Riahi, Rogelj, De
Stercke, Cullen, Frank, Fricko, Guo, Gidden, Havlík, Huppmann,
Kiesewetter, Rafaj, Schoepp and Valin [49], and also non-linear change
in technology innovation could be added to the literature. A challenge
lies in translating these long-term effects to current policy advice. Sci-
entists should be clear about the effect their long-term scenarios – and
their underlying assumptions - can have on short-term policymaking.
We have tried to summarize key elements policy makers can act upon
and that are common to sustainable scenarios. They translate to a set of
no-brainers and no-regret options that policy makers should push and
that all speak for renewable energy technologies, such as avoiding fossil
fuel system lock-ins, harnessing dormant efficiency potentials and
lowering demand, or maximize co-benefits and mitigate trade-offs in
line with international agreements. The question whether 100% is
feasible or not does not change the implications for immediate fast
expansion of renewables.
What can policy makers do? In line with the High-level Political
Forum's review on SDG7 this past July, we call upon policymakers to
speed up the renewables transition: Do not lose time, start by starting.
Policymakers can support ample technology research to develop a wide
a portfolio of technology options, not in search of the silver bullet but to
keep the system flexible. While disruption cannot be steered per se,
policy makers can level the playing field by adjusting regulations to
novel business models and evolving technologies and services. We need
to create an enabling environment, with conditions that spur innova-
tion and anticipation. All of this will push renewables and in the end, it
13 Space X White Paper: http://www.spacex.com/sites/spacex/files/
hyperloop_alpha-20130812.pdf.
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is likely that this will translate to a close to 100% renewable future.
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